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Abstract 
Most research on rule-based inference under uncertainty has 
focused on the normative validity and efficiency of various 
belief-update algorithms. In this paper we shift the attention 
to the inputs of these algorithms, namely, to the degrees of 
beliefs elicited from domain experts. Classical methods for 
eliciting continuous probability functions are of little use in a 
rule-based model, where propositions of interest are taken to be 
causally related and, typically, discrete, random variables. We 
take the position that the numerical encoding of degrees of 
belief in such propositions is somewhat analogous to the 
measurement of physical stimuli like brightness, weight, and 
distance. With that in mind, we base our elicitation techniques 
on statements regarding the relative likelihoods of various clues 
and hypotheses. We propose a formal procedure designed to (a) 
elicit such inputs in a credible manner, and, (b) transform them 
into the conditional probabilities and likelihood-ratios required 
by Bayesian inference systems. 
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1. Introduction 
Most rule-based expert systems fall in the category of deductive, 
inexact, classification models: given a set of observable clues, 
MI G M, an inference engine algorithm attempts to discern a set 
of hypotheses, H ' G  H, which provides the best explanation to MI. 
M and H are sets of propositions related to each other through 
inexact inference rules. For example, consider the following 
reasoning chain: the act of smoking (a disposition) increases the 
likelihood of a heart disease (an hypothesis), which, in turn, is 
sometimes manifested through a chest ache radiating to the left 
arm (a manifestation). This line of reasoning is plausible, but 
not necessarily categorical; many smokers will not develop any 
heart problems; likewise, chest ache is not a unique 
manifestation of heart disease. Hence, although causal 
information is indeed useful, any inference drawn from it must be 
qualified by the impreciseness of the underlying rules. 
During the past decade, a number of models were put forward to 
represent and carry out rule-based inference under uncertainty. 
are rule-based belief-update algorithms (Duda 
and Shortliffe, 1977), influence diagrams (Howard and Matheson, 
1981), and belief networks (Pearl, 1986). These models are 
closely related to each other at the elicitation level, requiring 
human experts to specify a coherent set of degrees of belief 
reflecting the uncertainty associated with inference rules. This 
elicitation task, which is normally delegated to a knowledge 
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engineer, is the focus of this paper. Throughout the paper, we 
use the belief network paradigm as our working environment; at 
the same time, our results are equally applicable to any 
inference model involving inexact rules. 
A belief network is an acyclic, directed graph, consisting of 
propositional nodes and causal arcs. The directed arc (x,y) 
emanating from node x to node y represents our belief that x 
causes y directly. The strength of this causal relationship is 
modeled through the conditional probability P(y1x). If a node y 
has multiple causes, {xl, ...,xn), the degree of belief associated 
with this complex relationship is the conditional probability 
tensor ~ ( y l x ~ ,  ...,xn). 
A belief network can be encoded as a set of inexact inference 
rules. In the rule-based terminology, an arc (x,y) and its 
label ~ ( y / x )  correspond to the rule IF x THEN y WITH DEGREE OF 
BELIEF ~(ylx). These rules are elicited from human experts. 
Automatic inference is carried out by following reasoning chains 
from the observable evidence, M1, back to its possible 
explanations, HI. This backward reasoning process is 
accompanied by a belief-update algorithm designed to order the 
prospective hypotheses h'E HI in terms of the posterior beliefs 
P(h1 ]MI). Unfortunately, this belief-update procedure is 
exponential in the size of the network, and, in general, is NP- 
hard (Cooper, 1987). If, however, the topology of the network 
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meets certain criteria, posterior beliefs may be computed 
efficiently (Pearl, 1986) . 
A belief network is constructed through an elaborate knowledge 
elicitation procedure involving domain experts and knowledge 
engineers. Now, humans are normally good at suggesting causal 
relationships between evidence and hypotheses. At the same time, 
humans have serious problems in estimating the uncertainty 
associated with such conjectures. For example, a physician can 
swiftly suggest that the cause of swollen ankles (m) might be a 
certain heart disease (h). However, this same expert might be 
at loss when asked to estimate the subjective probability 
associated with this rule, ~(mlh). When pressed to do so, the 
expert will probably produce a number, but the validity of this 
estimate is clearly questionable. We propose a global approach 
to elicitation which minimizes the guesswork and yields a 
credible set of degrees of belief. 
2. The Problem 
Unlike early rule-based architectures, the belief network model 
has a sound interpretation on deductive as well as on 
probabilistic grounds. From a deductive standpoint, the 
network's nodes are viewed as propositions, and the network's 
topology reflects causal relationships among these propositions. 
From a probabilistic standpoint, these nodes are viewed as random 
variables associated with an unknown joint probability 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-88-95 
distribution function (PDF). The network's topology is analogous 
to a set of independence assumptions imposed on the PDF. 
Generally speaking, if two nodes are not connected, the random 
variables that they represent are assumed independent. These 
assumptions simplify the PDF considerably; hence, they also 
place an explicit constraint on the family of PDF's that might be 
modeled as belief networks. 
Consider, for example, the simple network depicted in Figure 1, 
taken from the domain of diagnosing heart diseases. This network 
has the following interpretation: the disease h may be caused by 
either cl, c2, or both. h, in turn, manifests itself through 
subsets of the symptoms {ml,m2,m3). These relationships are 
taken to be inexact. For example, it is possible that both cl 
and c2 obtain but h does not obtain. Likewise, it is possible 
(but not likely) that h obtains and none of the m's obtain. 
Fiqure 1 
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Hypothesis: Predispositions: 
h: heart disease cl: high Cholesterol count 
c2: smoking 
Symptoms : 
ml: chest ache radiating to the left arm 
m2: swollen ankles 
m3: shortness of breathing 
How can we elicit and represent the PDF P(cl,c2,h,ml,m2,m3)? one 
naive approach is to set up a global contingency table which 
specifies the joint frequencies of all possible combinations of 
propositions. Clearly, this is not a practical solution. 
Alternatively, if the propositions in question are arranged in a 
network like Figure 1, one can interpret the topology of the 
network as a graph-theoretic definition of the PDF: 
This derivation is based on a standard theorem in probability, 
the "chain rule," along with a set of marginal and conditional 
independence assumptions imposed on the PDF by the network's 
topology (Pearl, 1986) . Pearl has shown that a PDF like (1) is 
suspectable to an efficient belief-update algorithm which is 
consistent with probability theory. This algorithm computes 
posterior beliefs in hypotheses given any subset of observable 
clues (terminal nodes in the network), in time linear to the 
network's size. The algorithm involves only local computations, 
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and, in principle, can proceed in parallel. 
We now turn to the elicitation problem: in order to fully 
specify the belief network associated with a PDF like (I), the 
knowledge engineer must elicit three types of probabilities: 
(a) marginal probabilities associated with nodes with no 
parents, e.g. P(c1) and P(c2). 
(b) conditional probability tensors associated with multi- 
cause relationships, e.g. P(hlcl,c2)- 
(c) elementary conditional probabilities, e.g. P(mllh), 
~(m2lh), and ~(m3lh). 
The elicitation of conditional probability tensors is largely 
impractical, as the number of questions that one is required to 
ask grows exponentially with the number of propositions following 
the conditioning bar. There exist heuristic techniques, though, 
designed to approximate ~(hlc~,...,c~) from the set of elementary 
probabilities ~(hlc~), ..., P(hlcn) (Kim and Pearl, 1987). Hence, 
we see that the elicitation problem is primarily one of assessing 
elementary conditional probabilities. Therefore, we'll restrict 
our attention for now to the bottom tier of Figure 1, focusing on 
the relationships among h and its 3 manifestations. Our analysis 
can be easily extended to any number n>3 of propositions, so 
we'll sometimes use n=3 for brevity. 
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3. Two Propositions on Elicitation 
Our approach to elicitation is motivated by two key propositions 
regarding the direction and ratio-scale properties of implicit 
degrees of belief. These propositions are briefly discussed 
below. 
Proposition 1: some questions are easier to answer if you turn 
them around. 
Consider the rule <IF m THEN h WITH DEGREE OF BELIEF d(m,h)>. 
This is sometimes referred to as llabductivell or nbackwardll 
reasoning. That is, although the causal relationship between 
the hypothesis h and its manifestation m is h->m, we are 
typically faced with the problem of assessing the likelihood of 
the unknown h in light of the observable fact m. The 
interpretation of the belief function d(.l.) depends on our 
choice of a belief language. Most of these languages, though, 
are wunidirectional." That is, they consist of either diasnostic 
or causal inference, but not of both. For example, the certainty 
factors calculus and the Dempster-Shafer model require the expert 
to specify diagnostic degrees of belief in terms of C~(hlm) and 
~el(h/m), respectively. Conversely, the Bayesian belief network 
specifies the causal relationship "h causes mm directly, 
requiring the expert to estimate the causal degree of belief 
~(mlh), P being a probability. 
Indeed, there exist a growing body of literature suggesting that 
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humans find it easier to "think forward in reverse," preferring 
causal on diagnostic explanations of evidential reasoning 
(Einhorn and Hogarth, 1987, Shachter and Heckerman, 1987). These 
findings clearly render cognitive justification to the Bayesian 
belief network formalism. At the same time, the insistence that 
in any given situation human reasoning is confined to proceed in 
only one direction seems to be overly restrictive. For example, 
consider the rule <IF x smokes THEN it is likely that x will 
develop a heart disease>. Denote this rule by S -> HD. Which 
subjective probability is more credibly available from a human 
expert, P (HD ( S) or P (S I HD) ? 
The answer seems to depend largely on the experience of the 
expert, and, in particular, on his or her ability to retrieve 
examples from the S and HD populations. If the expert knows 
relatively far more smokers than she knows people with heart 
diseases, it is probably safer to use the smokers population as a 
reference group (Figure 2-a) and go on to assess P(HD[S). If, 
alternatively, we force this expert to specify P(S/HD), she will 
have to resort, in her mind, to a small sample (Figure 2-b), 
yielding a highly unreliable estimate of P(S/HD). The situation 
changes if the expert happens to be a heart disease specialist. 
 his latter expert will probably find it easier to assess 
P(S~HD), due to the large sample of people with heart disease 
that she can retrieve from her clinical work experience. 
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Fiaure 2-a Fiaure 2-b 
We see that the factors that influence implicit beliefs are both 
availability and representativeness (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974). The availability heuristic leads the expert to focus on 
the population which is more salient or vivid in his mind. 
Strictly speaking, this heuristic is beneficial only if it 
coincides with a larger population. If the selected background 
population is small, most people will still be willing to use it 
as a representative image of the overall population. This 
insensitivity to sample size, or the Itlaw of small numbers,If is a 
manifestation of the well-known representativeness bias. To 
debias this flaw, the expert should be encouraged to retrieve as 
many examples as possible from both populations. The larger 
sample should then be selected as the conditioning assumption. 
Hence, we wish to support experts who are willing to express 
their reasoning using diagnostic inference instead of or in 
tandem with causal inference. 
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Proposition 2: relative degrees of belief are more credibly 
available then absolute degrees of belief. 
We take the position that the numerical encoding of degrees of 
belief is somewhat analogous to the measurement of such physical 
stimuli as brightness, weight, and distance. Can you specify the 
aerial distances between New York, Tokyo, Cairo, and Seattle 
with good confidence? probably not. It seems obvious that you 
would rather prefer a statement like: Tokyo is about twice as far 
away from New York as Cairo is. In general, people find it 
easier to express differences between physical quantities (as 
well as preferences) using relative, pair-wise judgement, rather 
than a cardinal scale of measurement (Stevens, 1957, Stevens and 
Galanter, 1964, Krantz, 1973). Going back to the previous 
question, let's take New York as our point of departure, and 
consider the following pair-wise distance comparisons: 
Cairo 
Seattle 
New York 
Tokyo 
The entries in this table read as follows: from New York, Tokyo 
is 2 times as far as Cairo, and 3 times as far as Seattle. Also, 
Cairo is 2 times as far as Seattle. Note that these judgement 
are not only inaccurate but also inconsistent, as is normally the 
case with human inputs (the inconsistency may be resolved, for 
Tokyo Cairo Seattle 
1 2 3 
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example, by setting the third entry in the second row to 1.5). 
How can we synthesize this set of n(n-1)/2 pair-wise comparisons 
into a vector of n weights reflecting the true distances implicit 
in the human's answers? Several such methods have been proposed, 
e.g. least squares (Cogger and Yu, 1983), and logarithmic least 
squares (De Graan, 1980). However, perhaps the only method 
capable of synthesizing inconsistent inputs in a credible manner 
is the Eigenvector method proposed by T.L. Saaty (1980). This 
method is illustrated in the next section. 
3. One-Way Elicitation 
TO restate the elicitation problem, consider an hypothesis h and 
a series of related manifestations {ml, ..*,mn). Our goal is to 
estimate the probabilities vector ~=<~(m~lh), ... P(mnlh)> using 
pair-wise comparisons, elicited from a human expert. That is, 
rather than asking the expert to specify the absolute 
probabilities p(mi 1 h) and p(mj 1 h) , we ask her to estimate the 
extent to which mi is more likely than mj in light of h. These 
local judgments, which are likely to be inconsistent, will be 
further synthesized into a ratio-scale of probabilities. 
To illustrate, consider the following set of questions: 
Assume that a person X has a heart disease (h). 
Now consider the following two observations: 
X suffers from a chest ache radiating to the left arm (ml) 
X suffers from swollen ankles (m2). 
In your opinion, which observation (ml,m2) is more likely in 
light of h? (assume the expert answered ml) 
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To what extent is 
you think that ml 
number 1. If you 
ml more likely than m2? For example, if 
and m2 are equally likely, enter the 
think that ml is twice as likely as m2, 
enter the number 2. Feel free to enter any number greater 
than 1 that you think describes the extent to which ml is 
more likely than m2: 
With n manifestations, we have to ask the expert n(n-1)/2 such 
questions. The expert's answers are recorded in an nxn 
likelihood matrix, A, in which aij=P(milh)/~(m~lh). This 
approach is similar to Gupta and Wilson's (1987), who had 
experts express their opinions regarding the performance of 
competing forecast models. These inputs were recorded in a 
matrix A in which the element aij was the perceived odds that 
forecast model i will outperform forecast model j. 
The cognitive complexity of the elicitation may be somewhat 
mitigated if we ask the expert to first rank-order the 
manifestations in terms of decreasing perceived likelihoods, 
yielding (without loss of generality) an ordered set <ml, ..., mn> 
with p(mi 1 h) >p(mj 1 h) if i<j . This order sets up (an empty) 
likelihood matrix A in which (a) only the entries above the 
diagonal have to be specified, (b) all of these entries must be 
greater than or equal to 1, and, (c) the relation aij<aik must 
obtain for all i and jck. 
The resulting matrix, A, is positive reciprocal, with aij>0 and 
aij=l/aji. We are thus in the familiar domain of Saaty's 
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analytic hierarchy process, and we can proceed to compute the 
principal Eigenvector of A, denoted W. The crux of this approach 
is the notion that W is "ratio equivalentw to the unknown PI with 
wi/wj=~(miih)/~(mj1h) for all pairs <i,j>~{l, ..., n)x{l,..., n). 
For example, suppose n=3 and the true probabilities vector 
~=<~(mllh),P(m2/h),P(m31h)> is as follows: 
Had we had access to an expert whose judgement are perfectly 
calibrated with reality, we would end up with the following 
matrix: 
Each entry aij in the matrix represents the degree to which the 
manifestation mi is more likely than the manifestation mj in 
light of h, in the expert's mind. For example, 
Since A in the above ideal example is consistent, its principal 
Eigenvector is given by any of its columns. Thus, focusing for 
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example on the last column, we obtain the following weights 
vector: 
Due to A's consistency, the true probabilities vector P (2) and 
the weights vector W (3) are ratio-identical. In reality, 
though, the vector P is unknown, and the matrix A  is 
inconsistent. That is, the set of answers to the n(n-1)/2 
questions presented to the expert will yield intransitive 
responses, with 
P (mi 1 h) P(mj lh) 
------- * ------- 
P (mi 1 h) 
------- 
P (mj I h) P (mk / h) P(mkfh) 
Hence, in the general case, we have to deal with an inconsistent 
matrix. To illustrate, refer to the A  matrix, and assume that 
the expert's above-diagonal judgement alar a13, and a23 were 
+25%, -25% and +50% off mark (with respect to A ) ,  respectively, 
yielding the following inconsistent matrix: 
The normalized principal Eigenvector of this matrix is: 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-88-95 
Where do we proceed from here? the key assumption underlying our 
approach is that in spite of A's inconsistency, W' is still a 
good "ratio-estimatew of the unknown probabilities vector P. 
Thus, had we had a-priori knowledge, say, that ~(m~lh)=0.2, we
could have used it as an anchor to compute the following estimate 
P' of P: 
The difference between this result and the true probabilities 
vector P=<0.8,0.2,0.1> stems from the inconsistency of A t  and the 
imperfect knowledge that it represents. However, considering the 
expert's biasdeness and inconsistency, this result is 
surprisingly good, illustrating the robustness of the normalized 
Eigenvector to data perturbations. 
Of course, the ability to construct PI hinges on our a-priori 
knowledge of any one of its underlying probability elements. In 
some situations, we may anticipate this requirement ex-ante and 
augment the initial set of manifestation <ml, ..., mn> with an 
additional clue, m*, whose conditional probability ~(m*/h) is 
either known or can be credibly estimated. For example, in the 
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above heart disease scenario, m* might be the fact that the 
underlying patient is a male, the assumption being that the 
probability ~(malefheart disease) is well-known. 
There exist situations, however, in which we have no prior 
knowledge of any one of the underlying degrees of belief. In 
these cases, we can use an extension of the above technique in 
order to estimate the likelihood-ratio vector 
<~(m~jh)/~(m~lh),...,P(m~lh)/~(m~l~)>, - h being "not h." Methods 
to compute such vectors for dichotomous and multi-valued 
propositions are described in the next section. We conclude the 
present section with a brief comment regarding the scale of 
measure used throughout the paper. 
Our approach to elicitation is based on the assumption that 
humans are capable of describing relative likelihoods using 
numbers. This controversial assumption was challenged by many, 
not the least of them is H.R. Haldeman, Chief of Staff of 
President Nixon. Describing Kissingerls persistent concern about 
a Russian attack on China, Haldeman recalls how used to tease 
him about his use of percentages. He would say there was a 60% 
chance of a Soviet strike on China, for example, and I would say: 
why 60, Henry? Couldnlt it be 65% or 58%? (Kotz and Stroup, 
1983). Clearly, Haldeman's point is well taken. Although there 
exist evidence that people find it easier to assess odds rather 
than probabilities, the credibility of any numeric measure of 
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intuitive judgement is an open question. 
It was this motivation which led to Saaty's (1980) 1 to 9 scale, 
which is often accompanied with a verbal interpretation. This 
scale can be slightly modified to suit our elicitation context, 
as follows: 
1 - propositions p and q are equally likely 
3 - p is weakly more likely than q 
5 - p is strongly more likely than q 
7 - p is very strongly more likely than q 
9 - p is absolutely more likely than q 
The numbers 2,4,6, and 8 are used to express intermediate 
judgement between adjacent scale values. 
This scale has been justified by Saaty on analytical, 
psychological, and experimental grounds. In a similar vein, 
Lichtenstein and Newman (1967) have shown empirically that verbal 
descriptions of uncertainty may be mapped on ranges of 
probabilities. These findings are especially relevant to the 
Eigenvector method, which is insensitive to the type of scale 
being used. As Harker and Vargas (1987) argue, "One scale may be 
appropriate for one application and may not be appropriate for 
another. In this situation, a different scale could and should 
be chosen for each application." For example, in situations 
where little is known about a particular set of hypotheses, a 1 
to 3 scale might be used. Clearly, the freedom to modify the 
scale of measure or develop a totally new one adds significant 
flexibility to the elicitation task. 
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4. Two-way Elicitation 
Most realistic inference problems involve multi-valued 
propositions. For example, the dichotomous "heart diseasew 
hypothesis can be made finer by considering the following 
possibilities: 
hl: X is likely to suffer a fatal stroke 
h2: X is likely to suffer a mild stroke 
h3: X has no heart disease 
From a logical perspective, to say that h assumes one of the 
values in H={hl,hZ,h3} is equivalent to assigning truth values to 
the three dichotomous propositions hl, h2, and h3. We will 
assume henceforth that H enumerates all the possible values that 
h can attain and that these values are mutually exclusive. 
Using the techniques described in the previous section, we can 
condition our set of causal elicitation questions on each value 
of h, yielding three matrices and three weight vectors Whl, Wh2, 
and Wh3, where Whi is conditioned by the background hypothesis 
hi. Now, these three matrices and respective vectors are 
disjoint: one cannot use them to calculate likelihood-ratios 
across competing hypotheses. That is, although we can calculate 
the ratios, say, P(mi 1 hl)/p(mj 1 hl) and p(mi 1 h2)/p(mj / h2) within 
the vectors Whl and Wh2 there is no sufficient information to 
compute the more useful likelihood-ratios ~(rn~lh~)/~(m~lh~) and 
~ ( m j  1hl)/p(mj lh2). These ratios were termed by Alan Turing the 
'Iweights of evidencew carried by mi and mj, respectively, to the 
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statement Ifhl is preferred on h2" (Good, 1950). These weights of 
evidence play an important role in many Bayesian belief-update 
algorithms. 
Recall that the ultimate objective of any belief-update 
algorithm is to compute the posterior beliefs in the competing 
hypotheses H in light of {m lr.*.rmn). If these manifestations 
are ratio-independent with respect to H (Grosof, 1986), the 
posterior odds favoring hi on hj is given in terms of Bayes rule, 
as follows: 
This formula has the following tfmechanicalw interpretation: in 
the absence of any relevant evidence, the posterior odds are set 
to the prior odds, P(hi)/P(hj). When we know that a certain 
manifestation is present, say mk, we multiply these odds by the 
likelihood-ratio p(mklhi)/p(mk/hj). As more manifestations 
become available, the posterior odds are updated in a similar 
fashion. 
Hence, what we are after are likelihood-ratio vectors of the form 
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These vectors must be specified for all pairs of competing 
hypotheses <hi,hj>eH~H. 
How do we go about computing these vectors? we propose a 
solution, called two-way elicitation. The first stage of this 
procedure is identical to the one-way elicitation described in 
the previous section. Having completed this line of causal 
questions, we ask the expert to go through a second stage of 
diaanostic questions, The expert's answers are then synthesized 
into a set of n(n-1)/2 likelihood-ratio vectors like (5). For 
now, we assume that the second stage involves roughly the same 
number of questions as the first stage. As we'll see shortly, 
the second stage is far less demanding. 
A typical diaanostic question has the following form: 
Assume that a person X suffers from swollen ankles (m2). 
Now consider the following two possibilities: X will suffer 
a mild heart attack (h2), X has no heart disease (h3). 
In your opinion, which possibility (h2,h3) is more likely in 
light of m2 (assume the expert answered h2) 
To what extent is h2 more likely than h3? For example, 
if you think that h2 and h3 are equally likely, enter the 
number 1. If you think that h2 is twice as likely as h3, 
enter the number 2. Feel free to enter any positive real 
number that you think describes the extent to which h2 is 
more likely than h3: 
With the manifestation m2 fixed, three such pair-wise comparisons 
are required to construct a likelihood matrix and a diagnostic 
weight vector, denoted Wm2. Wm2 is taken to be ratio-equivalent 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-88-95 
21 
to the probabilities vector <P(hllm2),~(h21m2),~(h31m2)>. Two- 
way elicitation thus consists of two independent elicitation 
stages: in the first stage (described in the previous section), 
the three causal weight vectors WhlrWh2,Wh3 are computed. The 
second stage yields the three diagnostic vectors WmllWm2,Wm3. 
The restriction of n=3 can be easily lifted, and the number of 
hypotheses and manifestations need not be equal. We now show how 
these disjoint sets of vectors can be synthesized into the 
n(n-1)/2 likelihood-ratio vectors (5). 
The data gathered in the two-way elicitation procedure can be 
represented in two related, directed graphs (Figure 3). The 
nodes Mij and Hij represent the unknown probabilities p(rnilhj) 
and P (hi / mj ) , respectively. The directed arcs (Mi j ,Mkl) and 
(HijI Hkl) are labeled Mijk- and Hijkl , respectively. Each 
triangle Hk in the causal graph represents the causal weights 
vector WhkI k=1,2,3, with M ~ ~ ~ ~ = P  (mi I hk) /P (mj 1 hk) . As was argued 
earlier, these ratios are not particularly useful in their 
present form, and we are more interested in the likelihood-ratios 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ( m ~ l h ~ ) / ~ ( m ~ l h ~ )  , measuring the degree to which the 
manifestation mi serves to discriminate between the hypotheses hj 
and hk. In Figure 3, Mijik is the label of the "externalH arc 
connecting Mij and Mik across the two triangles Hj and Hk. 
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Causal graph Diagnostic graph 
Fiaure 3 
Let's focus on the following two sets of labels: 
Mij ik=P (mi I hj ) /P (mi I hk) (external, causal arcs) ( 6 )  
Hj iki'P(hj 1 mi) /P (hkl mi) (internal, diagnostic arcs) ( 7 )  
Also, denote the prior odds favoring hypothesis hk on hj by: 
okj = P(hk)/P(hj) (8) 
Given this notation, (6), (7), and (8) are related through Bayes 
rule: 
Hence, we see that the two graphs mirror each other. That is, 
every cro~s-trianqle arc Mijik at the causal graph is 
proportionally related to a within-trianale arc Hjiki at the 
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diagnostic graph. For example, the bold circuit (triangle M2) of 
the diagnostic graph is the "dual imagetf of the external circuit 
connecting a11 M2k nodes, k=1,2,3 across all triangles in the 
diagnostic graph. Hence, had we had access to a prior weights 
vector W0=<wlr...,wn> which is ratio-equivalent to the prior 
probabilities vector <P(hl), ..., P(h3)>, we could have used (9) 
to compute the desired likelihood-ratio vectors 
<~(m~lh~)/~(m~lhj) ,...fP(mnlhi)/P(mnlhj)> for any pair of 
competing hypotheses <hi,hj> HxH. 
It turns out that one half of the two-way elicitation procedure 
can be cut down considerably, due to some favorable graph 
properties. To illustrate, consider Figure 3. Once we 
nconstruct" any one triangle in the diagnostic graph, we can 
compute its dual external circuit in the causal graph, through 
(9). And, due to the topology of the causal graph, any such 
single circuit makes the entire causal graph connected, meaning 
that there is a path between any two given nodes. Let us define 
the "intensitytt of a directed path as the product of all the 
labels along the path. We immediately get, from the label's 
definition, that this is a telescopic product. For example, the 
intensity of the path <(M31,Mll), (Mll,M21) , (M2ltM22) ,(M22,M32)> 
is: 
P(m3 1 hl) p p (6) p-2, P (m3 1 hl) 
,,-,,,,, * -------- * -------- * -------- = -------- 
P ~ )  p W 1 )  P ( F 2  ) P(m3 / h2) P(m3 1 h2) 
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Similarly, the intensity of a loop is 1. This implies that the 
intensities of all the paths connecting a given pair of nodes 
are the same. This is true because the paths are directed, and 
the only difference between two paths with the same end-points is 
that one might consist of one or more loops. However, the 
intensity of these loops is 1, so they have no effect on the 
overall path intensity. 
Let us illustrate the relevance of this analysis to the 
elicitation problem. Suppose that we have gone through the first 
stage of the elicitation procedure, yielding the three triangles 
HI, HZ, and 8 3 .  We now turn to the diagnostic, second stage of 
the elicitation. After reviewing the various manifestations, we 
find out that M2, say, is the most reliable background population 
(recall proposition 2). Therefore, we proceed to compute the 
diagnostic weight vector WmZI which is represented by the bold 
triangle M2 in Figure 3. At that stage, if we have access to the 
prior weights vector, Wo, we can proceed to construct the 
circuit connecting all M2k nodes, k=1,2,3, in the causal graph. 
By llconstruct'v we mean that we can now compute the circuit's 
labels {M2122,M2223,M2321), which, in turn, allow us to compute 
any likelihood-ratio pertaining to m2. Moreover, we can now 
proceed to compute other desired likelihood-ratio 
Mikil=P (mi I hk) /P (mi 1 hl) , by simply taking the intensity of any 
path connecting the nodes Mik and Mil. Since the causal graph is 
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connected, at least one such path must exist. And due to the 
intensity uniqueness, this solution is also unique. 
Estimating prior probability vectors: We now turn to discuss the 
elicitation of the prior weights vector Wo=<wl, ..., wn> which is 
assumed to be ratio-identical to the prior probability vector 
<P(hl), -..,P(h,)>. In some situations, e.g. when the {hi} 
represent well-known diseases, this vector can be estimated from 
textbook information, field records, or other relevant background 
knowledge. In other situations, though, we have to elicit Wo 
from a domain expert. In the latter case, we can simply use the 
one-way elicitation procedure described in Section 3. That is, 
the expert will be asked to compare the relative likelihoods of 
all pairs <hi,hj> E HxH, forming a likelihood matrix. The 
desired vector, Wo, will then be taken to be the Eigenvector of 
this matrix. 
5. conclusion 
Our elicitation approach relies heavily on the Eigenvector 
method, the cornerstone of Saatyts Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) . As Harker and Vargas (1987) put it, the AHP framework is 
designed to cope with intuitive, rational, and irrational 
judgement, with and without certainty. It is thus natural, in 
our opinion, to apply it to the problem of eliciting degrees of 
belief, where rational knowledge is often combined with intuitive 
guts feeling and, on occasion, with inconsistent judgement. It 
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was argued by Fischhoff et a1 (1980) that it is inappropriate to 
think of a person's opinion about a set of events as existing 
within that person in a precise, fixed fashion, just waiting to 
be measured. And yet, asking experts to provide numeric degrees 
of belief and adding this information verbatim to a knowledge- 
base is a common practice among many knowledge engineers. We 
think that the elicitation problem deserves a more serious 
treatment. This paper is a step in this direction. 
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